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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AS SOCIAL PROCESS •
A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Ida R. Hoos
Research Sociologist
Space Sciences Laboratory
University of California, Berkeley

ABSTRACT
Technology transfer is the process by which important scien
tific and technological advance is translated into sociallydefined "benefits." Seen in this perspective, technology
transfer may be regarded as the way the United States invests
in the future, its own and that of other nations. With the
President's current scientific priority list heavily studded
with space-derived items, and the White House Fact Sheet on
Space Policy's strong emphasis on application, the mandate
is unmistakable. How it can best be implemented is not so
certain. Even viewed in retrospect, most known innovations
travel a tortuous road. In prospect, the path is almost com
pletely unpredictable. What is clear is that there must be ex
plicit recognition that technology transfer is in essence a
social process, that it does not take place by itself, and that
it occurs in a social environment, in which "success," how
ever defined, depends on a complicated web of synergistic
factors only tangentially related to the technology itself.
The notion of technology transfer is at least as old as fire and
certainly as commonplace as the adoption of the wheel. This
familiarity with the concept has probably contributed to the
tendency toward underestimating its complexity. NASA's
considerable experience with technological innovation and
the dynamics of transferring space-derived knowledge and
knowhow into terrestrial and perhaps more pedestrian
channels serves as the basis for this paper. With Landsat the
primary, but not the only, example, we analyze from the
sociological perspective the factors implementing and imped
ing technology transfer.

REPORT
A retrospective review of the terms that have recurred with
high frequency in federal policy over the past half century
would indicate the persistence of the idea of technology
transfer. Although the name has changed and the social con
text, such as war or peace, depression or prosperity, has
determined form and focus, the notion has nonetheless pre
vailed that scientific and technological advance spell oppor
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tunity. The challenge has been, then, to take advantage of
that opportunity, i.e. to make that opportunity materialize.
But our nostalgic exercise would soon show us that the
history of innovations and their dissemination, adaptation,
and adoption show more serendipity than "savvy/ that
chance played an important part, and that there was as much
error as trial in their road to success. Moreover, many of the
inventions that we now credit as revolutionary became im
portant only in their mutations and were given little recog
nition when they first appeared.
The important lesson that we can learn from history is that
technology transfer must be viewed as a social process in
the realistic perspective of its point in time. This is par
ticularly necessary for us because of the characteristics of
our own time-frame. Such an approach forces us to disen
cumber ourselves of the homespun homilies and comfortable
cliches that dominate our thinking. Instead, we mustexamine
in their present social dimensions the conceptions and per
ceptions bearing on technology transfer. Because we live in
the Space Age, we must take into account the ways in which
our peculiar ethos and expectations affect the process. This,
first of all, brings us immediately face to face with a number
of paradoxes, important, because they illustrate the extent
to which we are victims of "future shock."*
While, on the one hand, we cling to the belief that "necessity
is the mother of invention," we expect technological advance
that is far ahead of our adaptive capability to have instant
and visible pay-off. This now-orientation places an inordinate
burden on technologies to demonstrate their benefits pre
maturely, even before they have had a chance to develop
fully. One of the reasons for the high expectations is the
series of space spectaculars that gave the impression of "look
Ma - no hands." Everything appeared so smooth and simple:
someone twiddled a dial in Houston and men orbited the
earth, walked in space, and landed on the moon. Someone
pushed a button and a signal from Voyager I 400 million
miles into space detonated an explosion at Hutchison Junior
* Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, New York, Bantam Books,
1971.

regarded as a prerequisite for n*ew technology, may actually
be a result of its use. That invention may, in some circum
stances, be the mother of necessity has been amply demon
strated in developments surrounding the electronic computer.
Similarly, access to and application of Landsat data, for ex
ample, might help resource agencies define their needs and
refine their models. The capability of achieving a particular
objective itself becomes an important incentive.

College in Kansas. The combination of ease and perfection
encouraged a kind of can-do complex, in a form known as
the technological fix. The cliche that emerged became a
rallying cry, "A nation that can put a man on the moon
can ......." And any wishful thinker could supply his own
missing words.
Dangled before Congress and the public was the tantalizing
promise of the benefits to be derived from space exploration.
If technological transfer could be seen as imbued with applepie-and-motherhood, then space technology transfer could be
regarded as apple-pie-in-the-sky-and-motherhood. Hence, the
enticements in the form of "spinoff", which have ranged
from such bucolic benefits as pig pregnancy detectors to
satellite power systems to deliver the sun's bounty to an
energy-hungry world. And inspirational literature (and
speeches) pointed out the benefits for everyone, including
the Third World. All of this has put a special burden on
NASA, for to meet the expectations that have been raised
would require the services of a Rumpelstiltskin. Lacking
assistance from this magical monster, NASA tries to carry
out its mandate amid misconceptions that have boomeranged
and conceptions that have missed their mark. And, hoisted
with its own petard, it often does not get credit for some of

Underlying some of the misconceptions is the macho-chism
of the man-on-the-moon. There still persists the notion that
the techniques used by McNamara for managing the Depart
ment of Defense and credited for accomplishing the various
space missions could be applied in the social arena as well.*
Known to have been successfully utilized in the management
of complex systems, systems analysis, with its components
and companions, cost/benefit analysis, fault-tree/event-tree
analysis, and the like, became entrenched as TRW, i.e. the
Right Way, to approach social "Systems", the logic being
that they, too, were systems and large and complex. The
result is best described in the statement by Maslow**: "If the
only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to treat everything
as if it were a nail." The tools have come to dominate public
decision-making largely because they carry the irresistible
appeal of "logic" and "rationality;" both highly valued con
cepts in our Technological Era. While NASA sometimes re
ceives credit for systems techniques as one of its spin-off
items, it always pays a price. To begin with, it is required,
perhaps even more than the service-oriented agencies, to pro
duce justification, on the basis of the cost/benefit ratio, not
only for its own existence vis-a-vis other federal agencies in
the national budget but also for many of its own internal

its outstanding contributions.
A basic misconception stems from the nature of the tech
nology to be transferred. Here, space technology operates
under a handicap because of the oversell by apologists who
have satisfied the requirement for a favorable cost/benefit
ratio by roseate promises. The image of the cornucopia ready
to pour forth its usufruct is unfortunate, for it is at this point
that the apple-pie-in-the-sky syndrome and the look-Ma-nohands notion collide. The facile intimations that there are
beneficial items up there and that they can be readily put to
use down here are detrimental to the very effort they are
.intended to support. U. S. space policy calls for application
but little explicit recognition is made of the fact that to
transmute space-derived technology into forms responsive to
terrestrial needs is a complicated, customized task which in
volves concerted action by many agencies and levels of gov
ernment and the private sector as well. And, although official
statements out of NASA acknowledge that technology trans
fer does not happen by itself/ the message loses something
in its translation through budgetary allocations into organ
izational terms. In fact, observation of the apportionment of
funds reminds one of Anthony Downs' famous recipe for
horse-and-rabbit stew, with support for the transfer process

programs.
This has resulted in a curious anomaly. There has been, on
the one hand, the need to justify the long-range plans that a
space agency must make, but the time-and-money con
straints of the budgeting cycle have had to be respected.
There is, besides, the need to convince Congress of the pay
off in terms it can understand and accept. And this is where
another homely adage causes a problem. Schooled to believe
that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating," we are in
clined to expect a tangible product, whereas thanks to future
shock, or whatever accounts for the drag, we might not
recognize a pudding when we saw it and would not know
how to eat it if we did!
How one can realistically put a dollar sign on the returns
from innovations where potential has barely been tapped is a
mystery known only to model-makers faced with a do-or-die
assignment. Quantifying pie-in-the-sky is no easier than de
livering it! When, as is the situation with Landsat, the trans-

the rabbit.
Another misconception particularly damaging to the appli
cation of space-derived technology is created by the almostsuperstitious belief that necessity is the mother of invention.
Besides encouraging a passivity inimical to the idea of inno
vation, this anachronistic adage fails to reflect the scope and
pace of modern technological advance. Perceived need, once

* Ida R. Hoos, Systems Analysis In Public Policy: A Cri
tique, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972.

* cf . Technology Utilization At Work and other publications,
which start off with the sentence, "Aerospace spinoffs rare
ly occur automatically."

** Abraham Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaisance, Harper & Row, New York, 1966.
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fer is not, strictly speaking, that of technology, but of the
know-how to use data derived from the satellite, the evalu
ation process becomes even more attenuated. Economists
who have wrestled with the problem of the value of informa
tion in the abstract would certainly be baffled if they had to
identify dollar benefits from data that we are just learning to
use and whose potential is nowhere near realization. The true
value of better management of resources may not be fully
appreciated in this century. But this should not demean the
effort.
On the other hand, the "productivity urge" imposed by cost/
benefit strictures has encouraged the tendency to over-rate
the trivial, because it can be seen and counted. The net effect
reminds one of the metaphor about the mountain which
labored and gave birth to a mouse. Highly-placed committees
and high-level conferences concentrate on the small what's
rather than the big how's. Emphasis on product is, in some
ways, a diversionary tactic, for it limits focus to technical
considerations. Thus, we invariably find technical people
talking to technical people, with the "user community" a
shadowy entity somewhere far out in the real world. The
process of transfer attracts far less attention than its import
ance and its complexity warrant. Moreover, because activities
related to transfer do not fit the standard management
model, they run the risk of being undervalued, swept under
the fiscal rug, or lost in the organizational maze. Thus,
NASA's considerable contribution to solar photovoltaic tech
nology, with exciting applications in rural areas of this
country and of less developed countries, do not get counted
even though they represent the essence of intergovernment
cooperation, linking NASA with the Department of Energy
and the Agency for International Development, and the
quintessence of user-oriented transfer activity. Funding has
to be found through "creative bookkeeping", because al
though costs can be counted, benefits, by their very nature,,
remain incalculable. Already adversely affected by overzealous application of the "Space Age management tech
niques" that made cost/benefit analysis a prime requirement
in the federal budgetary process, NASA finds its technology
transfer efforts handicapped because of the way state and
local agencies have embraced the methodology. They, too,
operate in a now-oriented environment. The exigencies of the
moment cause them to welcome only specific technologies
identified as relevant to their current problems. And if an
innovation is not immediately and visibly cost/effective, it
is likely to encounter many road blocks, especially in an era
of Proposition 13 thinking. Where we are dealing with
remote-sensing, effectiveness of which depends mainly on
the astuteness and sophistication with which the data it can
yield are used, there are probably more potent impeding
than implementing factors in the cost/benefit balance.
William L. Kahrl, as Director of Research, Governor's Office
of Planning & Research, State of California, sets forth the
criteria in no uncertain terms:
For California . . .the problem of achieving ongoing
applications of Landsat technology involves not the
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adoption of a system but a conversion of our existing
systems. For this purpose, it is probably not sufficient
that the technology is economical; it must be inexpensive
enough to justify trashing another system. It is not
sufficent that the technology is useful; it must be unique
ly so. It is not sufficient that the technology is simply
efficient; it must be better than what we are already.*
The business community has its own agenda. Thomas J.
Kelley**, vice-president of Grumman Aerospace Corporation
puts industry's position succinctly:
. . .our approach, quite simply, has been to try to develop
products that somebody would buy -- for money -- and
that would thereby generate a profit.
Interesting to note, the item Mr. Kelley chose as an illus
tration was one that was a result of serendipity. "'We got into
technology transfer with the product shown in Figure I [an
aluminum canoe] before we even knew what technology
transfer wajs." (Italics added). Although his catalogue of
applications was varied, none of the products in the con
sumer market had yet brought substantial return on invest
ment. But he expressed optimism***'
We keep hoping that if we look hard enough, we'll event
ually find products that we can truly make some money
on and, at the same time, help out the public sector.
Industry, understandably, is in business for itself; its role in
technology transfer may, however, be understated by the
apparent end-product emphasis. Many companies have
applied aerospace technology to new processes and methods
that improve productivity and products. Contributions like
these may be of enormous value socially and economically
but the measuring instruments we use in our drunkard's
search**** for highly visible yield cause us to ignore them.
* William L. Kahrl, as Director of Research, Governor's
Office of Planning & Research, State of California, "Over
view of California's Approach to a Statewide Remote Sensing
Program," Address deliver to the National Conference of
State Legislatures Remote Sensing Workshop, Cal-Neva
Lodge, Lake Tahoe, November 8, 1977, p.4.
** Thomas J. Kelley, "An Aerospace Technology Devel
oper's Perspective," Aerospace Technology Transfer to the
Public Sector, AIAA-NASA Workshop Conference, Crystal
City, Virginia, November 9-11, 1977, Proceedings, New
York, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
June, 1978, pp. 20-21.
*** Ibid., p. 25.
**** Abraham Kaplan ("The Conduct of Inquiry," San
Francisco, Chandler, 1964, page 11,) recounts the story of a
drunkard hunting under a lamppost for keys he has dropped
some distance away. When asked why he didn't look there,
his reply was, "It's lighter here".

Because Landsat supplies a picture in full living color of the
social dimensions of technology transfer, it serves as a useful
case in point. Encountered first off is the difficulty of defini
tion: Landsat is not being transferred anywhere; it stays in
orbit. Nor, strictly speaking, will there be a transfer of remotesensing technology. Called for in the current White House
Fact Sheet on U.S. Civil Space Policy is selective utilization,
NASA having been changed to "emphasize space applications
that will bring important benefits to an understanding of
earth resource, climate, weather, pollution, and agricul
ture . . . ." for"all classes of users/' But here official language
obscures the reality. "Applications" cannot "bring important
benefits," and "understanding of earth resources" does not
automatically improve husbandry. The human links that are
crucial to every stage of the process of making Landsat
accessible so that it may be applied usefully are not official
ly adknowledged. Thus not only is the look-Ma-no-hands
notion perpetuated, but also an inappropriately normative
objective imposed, viz. delivery of "important benefits."
Whether there will be benefits, and whether the benefits
will be important depend on many factors, political and
economic in nature. These are intrinsic to a vast social ex
periment, a learning process, that is just occurring.

ongoing and ready source of data. However, the EROS
contribution depends neither on its internal capability nor
on its service to users but on the way the budget-makers view
the EROS mission. Thus, unless the data-distribution link is
supported by policy and funds, Landsat cannot possibly
"bring important results."
Moreover, NASA is no monolith; within its organizational
structure, there are philosophical differences that affect
Landsat applications programs. How responsibilities are con
strued and allocated profoundly influences the way in which
transfer is effectuated. The reciprocal interplay of conceptual
and personnel changes has, over time, had a marked impact
on programmatic approaches. To be sure, remote sensing user
development has always been a basic objective, and the pro
cess appears to have been developmental with the current
ASVT (Applications System Verification.and Transfer Pro
gram) the culmination.
Three regional Program Centers, designated to serve as the
principal contacts for state and local governments in their
area, act as technical middle-men. Dr. Anthony Calio, Asso
ciate Administrator for Space and Terrestrial Applications,
described the Program as follows:

Much that has been going on with respect to Landsat, there
fore, has been an exploration of the ways in which remote
sensing can, or can be made to, yield the kind of data that
would be useful in the management of natural resources.
That this complex process is trussed and truncated for man
agement purposes to fit into a slot called Technology Trans
fer on an organizational chart is due more to the vicissitudes
and vagaries of bureaucratic nomenclature than to NASAs
philosophy. The net result is, nonetheless, to subject this
highly complex process to conditions which are intrinsical

The objective of the regional Remote Sensing Appli
cations Program is to systematically transfer, primarily
to state and local governments, the ability to effectively
use Landsat data for their resource management and
planning decisons.*
Obviously, each of the Regional Centers interprets its man
date in its own particular ways. It is a reflection of the man
ager's personality and style rather than a manifestation of set
rules. How the differences among the Regional Centers may
ultimately affect the reception and utilization of Landsat's
data is another matter.** Only time and some measurement
instrument more sensitive than a bean-counter will tell.
Certainly, "service" cannot be rated in terms of numbers
of "show-and-tell" presentation:, nor success be calculated
by volume of inquiries. Right now, the ASVT Program shows
promise of fostering a somewhat more functionally coordin
ated approach to Landsat data usage. But, as we have so
often seen, reports may look better than the reality.

ly unsuitable.
Landsat not being merely a hardware concept, its ultimate
success or failure must rest not on what it does so much as
what others do with the data it can gather. Accessibility is a
key factor here. In fact, Michael J. McCormick,* who partici
pated actively in and has prepared a thoughtful review of the
Pacific Northwest's Land Resource Inventory Demonstration
Project, stresses the point:
Delays and uncertainty in obtaining data through the data
dissemination system have often precluded [their] use.

* Anthony J. Calio, Statement before the Subcommittee of
Space Science and Applications, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, p. 7, June 27,
1978.

But other agencies besides NASA are involved. The U.S.
Geological Survey, for example, has responsibility, through
its EROS (Earth Resources Observation Systems) program,
for acquiring, processing, distribution, and applying remotelysensed data to earth resources and environmental matters.
Hence, EROS figures significantly in Landsat's progress as an

** Having been privileged to observe at first hand only with
the Ames Research Center, I can cite it as worthy of honor
able mention. The resiliency that has somehow eluded organ
izational ossification, the commitment to the ideal of tech
nical service to the public and not merely technical program
packaging -- these are prime manifestations of the philosophy
prevailing among Western Regional Programs managers.
Working with them has reinforced for me the importance of

* Michael J. McCormick, 'The Pacific Northwest Regional
Commission's Land Resource Inventory Demonstration
Project — The User's Experience," AIAA/NASA Conference
on "Smart" Sensors, Hampton, Virginia, Nov. 14-16, 1978.

the human side of this effort.

6-4

Lost as I am in the grooves of academe, I may not be able
to
see the trees in proper perspective. But not to mention
the
role of the educational institutions of the country in the
on
going saga of Landsat would be to omit an important,
and
curiously controversial, dimension. In some circles, the
un
iversities have been viewed as sponges, absorbing much
but
producing little. In the eternal scramble for funding, university
faculty have been accused of pursuing their own high-flying
interests. At the AIAA meetings of November, 1977,explicit
criticism of NASA for over-reliance on universities was
the
springboard for advancing the use of other channels as trans
fer agents. To be sure, the typical professor's Gradus
ad
Parnassum within his citadel is probably not "in synch" with
the technical exigencies of remote-sensing. But there are very
important functions that are properly within the university
bailiwick -- the testing of technical improvements, new
uses
for Landsat, new methods of analysis of Landsat data,
for
example. The acrimonious debate over whether training
or
education is the proper objective for an institution of higher
learning goes on. Nevertheless, the basic role and function
of the universities* vis-a-vis transfer of technology and
of
remote sensing in particular are indisputable. Even though
preoccupation in some sectors with application has generated
a kind of impatience for the slower-paced, longer-horizon
ed
research and education aspects, they are nonetheless valu
able. The grumbling that NASAs past support of university
programs was a "failure" and that future funds should go
to
"doers" is a manifestation of misunderstanding. In fact,
assessment of "failure" may be more a matter of partial
perspective than of impartial truth. Without the reservoir
of university research to draw on, remote sensing technology
could not have attained its present state of applicability.
Work still goes on to test out new technical improvements
,
new uses, new methods of analysis. University-based special
ists provide needed support services to ongoing projects.
Sometimes obscured in the smoke of battle has been
the
contribution of the universities of this and other countries
to the advance of remote sensing. Not the least of this
has
been the leadership thus developed. NASA-supported
pro
jects at the universities of the world were, are, and
will
continue to be a major source of skilled and often-inspired
manpower, a resource that defies quantification. Remote
sensing still draws its main impetus and direction from
an
array of talent directly linked to the universities. In
the
words of Dr. John De Noyer**:

Private sector involvement in the Landsat application process
is a matter of earnest policy, endorsed by a kind of intuitive
faith that industry could, under certain conditions, derive
benefit from and act as a constituency for Landsat. This
be
lief is evidenced in a kind of ritual ballet that takes the form
of periodic meetings at which NASA affirms its determina
tion to have private industry share the bounty and booty
of remote sensing and industry airs its grievances over
the
frustrations of dealing with the federal government. Promi
nent among the latter are the regulations, the Code of Feder
al Regulations now running to some 70,000 pages. In an area
as sensitive as that of the proprietorship of information and
of software, "total disclosure" edicts constitute a roadblock.
In fact, as one observer puts it/ "Some businesses find
the
simplest solution to be the cop-out."
Another problem stems from federal paperwork require
ments. "In some industries, heads of research and develop
ment report that they spend more manhours filling out
government requests and reports than in doing the research
itself, and that these requirements are smothering the very
initiative and innovation whose decline the President
la
ments."
While there is no denying the validity of these complaints,
neither is there any gainsaying the need, from the official
point of view, of (a) regulations and (b) accountability
.
These are matters neither new nor exclusive to Landsat.
In
spite of them Landsat seems to be generating considerable
industry activity, listed by Tuyahov** as follows: major
aerospace firms; firms producing digital image analysis
systems and/or providing image analysis services; firms pro
viding remote-sensing analytical services (including scientific
discipline consultation); firms providing geo-referenced
in
formation systems and/or service; firms producing equip
ment related to remote sensing (digitizers, scanners, etc.),
firms providing remote-sensing data acquisition services; notfor-profit organizations; firms providing training services; and
financial investment analysis organizations.
Just how and how much Landsat contributes to the Gross
National Product cannot even be guess-timated. The more,
in
fact, that it does, the less likely are we to know the exact
details.
Landsat data are a tool in the operations of private mining
and petrochemical companies. According to authoritative
opinion, they also figure prominently in the multi-milliondollar crop forecasting business.*** But figures on market-

The prime role for the universities is one of research and
teaching. These are so very vital that the whole effort
would not last long without them. But time and patience
are essential; we need to go through a whole generation of
students before we can expect to have a cadre of trained
people."

* Leo-Arthur Kelmenson, "Whatever Happened to U.S.
Innovation?" The New York Times, February 4, 1979.
** Alex -Tuyahov, "Industrial Initiative," Conference
for
Suppliers of Remote Sensing, Springfield, Virginia, October
19-20, 1978.

* I use the term loosely to include all academic institutions
of higher learning.
** Dr. John De Noyer, Research Geo-Physicist, Geologic
Division, U. S. Geologic Survey, informal remarks at ISETAP
meeting, April 6 & 7, 1978.

*** Aviation Week and Space Technology, October
17,

1977, p. 61.
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come closest to approaching homogeneity; (2) they share, to
a degree, perspectives and problems; and (3) we know more
about them as users actual or potential, of Landsat.* Landsat
use by state, regional, and local agencies has been tabulated,
surveyed, analyzed, and documented enough so that the
numbers need not occupy us here. Suffice it to say that, in
general, an appropriate maxim would be, "Familiarity breeds
attempt," for the charts show a participation growth on the
part of states from 3 in 1974 to 35 in 1978, with similar
trends for resources agencies. There is, notwithstanding the
upward curves on charts, reason to believe that states would
be more receptive to Landsat if they had the technical cap
ability to use its data. The ISETAP (Intergovernmental
Science, Engineering and Technology Advisory Panel) ob
serves:** "States need more than raw data in order to utilize
Landsat .... They need technical assistance to develop an
initial Landsat capability and continuing assistance to stay
abreast of technological development and improvements/'
This may be construed as a cogent argument for a concerted
technology transfer effort on the part of the federal govern
ment, something which has been seen as neglected in the
"disproportionate balance of attention to the satellite."

ability and profitability, essential in attracting industry in
volvement, are lacking. Where government subsidy is pro
posed as an incentive, questions arise as to how much and for
how long. Even more basic are questions relating to the ulti
mate role of the private sector in satellite technology. Should
private corporations go into business for themselves, e.L,
launch their own vehicles, own and distribute data for a
fee, convert the data and sell them according tg their own
rulebook? Particularly serious policy questions can be
raised about the propriety of restricting, by price or other
means, open access to data acquired by satellite systems built
with tax dollars. Sticky questions arise about acquisition of
data from satellites launched by foreign countries whose
regulations and restrictions may be different from those
imposed by the U.S. Answers here become serious issues,
colliding head-on with implications in the international
sphere, as well as in arenas relating to invasion of privacy*
and freedom of information.
There are many paradoxes in the industry position. Some
spokesmen argue for subsidy, with the public good as the
goal and airlines and agriculture as the analog. Others protest
government participation on the ground that technical ser
vices and training activities constitute unfair competition.
Active government involvement is required, some claim,
because industry has not demonstrated the will to move
forward vigorously and because little progress would have
been made had not government taken a leadership role. Im
plicit in much of the debate has been the value at end-use
point of the satellite-derived information. And here more
questions are raised: Who are the users? How are they best
served? Who ultimately benefits from remote-sensing tech
nology? Embedded here are basic policy matters, at the
cross-roads between politics, economics, and social justice.
Papered over by pious references to "industry-government
interfaces/' "cooperative federalism," and the like, they
nonetheless will continue to exist, not only with respect to
space - but to all technology transfer in which the American

Redefinition of Landsat to signify a data delivery system
might direct official attention to problems that have under
mined its usefulness and seriously impeded the transfer pro
cess. States generally report inadequate coordination within
the data-delivery system as particularly troublesome. Re
flected here is the need for synchronization of activity on the
part of the two federal agencies and of elements within at
least one of them, viz. the U.S. Geological Survey. State and
local resource agencies, fragmented in function and often
criticized for it, are quick to advise the federal government to
"get their act together." But even while complaining about
duplication and requesting better coordination, states voice
considerable reservation about "centralization" and its
implications for the democratic process. Not only with re
spect to Landsat but prevailing in most programs linking
federal with state and local government is concern about
ultimate control. Moreover, as indicated in a General Accounting Office Report***, state and local officials like
industry spokesmen evince reluctance to become involved
with federal agencies because of the red tape, i.e. the paper
work, and the regulations associated with technical assist
ance. Here, then, we reach an impasse: while heavy federal
presence seems to be necessary in bringing Landsat to the
local scene, it does not occur free of encumbrance. The re-

public has a stake.
The four-letter word most used in connection with Landsat,
but the one least understood, is user. Thus, although NASA
has geared programs to users, has concentrated on user de
velopment, and, as in the Pacific Northwest Land Resource
Inventory Demonstration Project, takes pride in user-driven
applications, there is no satisfactory definition to fit all cat
egories of user. Heterogeneous, diffuse, and dispered at
different levels and points in the dissemination process,
users might be the technical middlemen providing service to
oil prospectors, middle managers charged with making supply
forecasts in a water agency, or Hoopa Tribal Council elders
concerned with their hunting and fishing rights. Or they
might be a fellow federal agency like the U.S. Department of
Agriculture seeking to update crop forecasting services.

* Hence, they are the drunkard's keys under the streetlamp.
Intergovernmental Science, Engineering and Technology
Advisory Panel (ISETAP), Natural Resources and Environ
ment Task Force, OSTP, State and Local Government on a
Landsat Information System, June, 1978, pp. 18-19.

At the risk of conducting a drunkard's search, we will focus
attention on state and local governments (1) because they

U.S. General Accounting Office, State and Local Gov
ernments' Views on Technical Assistance, GGD-78-58,
July 12, 1978, p.ii.

* Many people are worried about "the spy in the sky."
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lationship between federal and state levels has more
lovehate than equal-partnership characteristics. It is also
apparent
that institutional arrangements for the "cooperative
fed
eralism" have yet to be achieved. The Pacific Northwest
Project offers some interesting possibilities, but success
may
have been due to novelty. It remains to be seen whether
the
PNW Project can be institutionalized -- or can survive
that
ossifying process.
There is, indeed, a body of research that supports
the hy
pothesis that the financial and technical resources
provided
by federal programs relate only tangentially to adoption
and
implementation of innovation by state and local
govern
ments.* Contrary to the familiar notion that local
and state
bodies are backward, inherently uninnovative, and
incapable
of appreciating the apple-pie of technical programs
served up
by the federal government, the claim has been made**
that
local public officials are behaving rationally, in view
of the
problems they face and the social conditions in which
they
exist. Some of these impinge directly on Landsat's
reception
and are, therefore, worth mentioning in this context.
There
is, first and foremost, the boomerang effect of the
oversell
of management information systems in general. The
disillu
sionment stemming from almost ten decades of big
invest
ment in and small return from such efforts inspired
a city
planner in St. Louis to deliver an incisive paper whose
title
conveys its message: "Urban Planning Information Systems
-Name One That Works!"*** Kindelberger points
to short
ages of money, sophistication, sustained data collection
cap
ability, and political support as deterrents to information
systems' usefulness. A detriment less recognized but
a valid
caveat is presented as follows:
... in addition to being unable to produce certain
plan
ning data, information systems have a second shortcoming
in their very real potential for providing meaningless
or
* R.K. Yin, et al, A Review of Case Studies of Technologica
l
Innovations in State and Local Services, Santa Monica,
The
Rand Corporation, R-1870-NSF, February, 1976,
Final
Report on National Science Foundation Grant RDA
7504134

false data. Unfortunately, by wrapping such information
in the glitter of computer printout, the ease with which
it
is recognized as junk, and rejected, may be impaired.
His conclusion is nonetheless forward-looking and
useful
when we consider Landsat from the viewpoint of state
and
local users:*
The relative importance of hard data, and rigorous
sys
tems analysis may have declined for planning, in compar
ison with an appreciation for values, intuition, and
the
potential process; just as, with demise of the "McNamara
approach" it has in other aspects of American society.**
Yet the need for current inventories of land use, dwelling
units, land characteristics, and many other data
series
remains fundamental to the successful performance of
the
professions. (Emphasis added).
A problem fundamental to applications occurs
because
"state-of-the-art" technology is constrained by the
state of
other arts. State and local users, lacking the financial
and
technical means to undertake the research and adaptation
activities, or to revise and update their resource information
models, can take only limited, if any, advantage. There
is, as
was pointed out earlier in this paper, the need to
justify
innovation by visible cost-effectiveness. With state and
local
officials under pressure to reduce the costs of government
and lower taxes, priority may be given to immediate
and visi
ble physical improvements, such as a new fire station,
rather
than the less tangible, longer range returns from better
plan
ning. A serious deterrent to the fullest exploration
of any
technology's potential is the current management
style,
which requires at all levels an evaluation, patently premature,
of its cost-effectiveness. To say that cost is the cart
put be
fore the technical horse is to express a basic problem.
Most
users of Landsat data cannot yet assess their value, which
lies
in the uses to which they are put. How well Landsat
tech
nology is utilized will depend on factors unrelated
to the
inherent potential of the technology and related quite
direct
ly to the activities supporting the transfer process.
Perhaps, knowing this, we can now arrive at a socially
mean
ingful definition of Technology Transfer: the dissemination
of and assistance in making beneficial use of technologica
l
advances. This implies a real-life flow diagram, with
all the
program elements attuned in a holistic plan, structured
to
involve the entire community and responsive to the longterm

** Paul J. Flynn (Research Associate at Syracuse
Research
Corporation) and W. Henbambright (Professor of
Political
Science and Public Administration Maxwell School
of
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University
and
Director of the Science & Technology Policy Center,
Syra
cuse Research Corporation), "Helping the Cities:
Are the
Feds Taking the Easy Way?" Urban Technology, November,

needs of the society.
* Ibid.

1978, pp. 18-23.

** For a critique, see p. 3 of this paper and Ida R.
Hoos,
Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique.

*** Charles P. Kindleberger, III (then Chief, Governmenta
l
Assistance Division, St. Louis County Department
of Plan
ning), "Urban Planning Information Systems - Name
One
That Works!" Submitted for presentation at CB/NASA.
**** Charles P. Kindleberger, III, op. cit., p.4.
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